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Institutional directors and the quality of information: the role of 
directors appointed by banks 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question: The objective of this paper is to study the impact that directors who 
represent institutional investors have on the quality of financial reporting. We focus on those 
who maintain business relations with the firm on whose board they sit (pressure sensitive 
directors), and analyze their influence both on Boards and Audit Committees. Additionally, 
we examine the specific role of bank directors on Boards and Audit Committees and examine 
their effects on the quality of information when they act as shareholders and directors. 
 
Research Findings/Insights: Our results suggest that institutional directors are an effective 
monitoring device that leads to higher quality of financial reporting and, therefore, to less 
likelihood of qualified audit reports. Consistent with the relevant role of business relations 
with the firm, we find that directors appointed by pressure sensitive investors, both in Boards 
and Audit Committees, have a higher impact on the unqualified audit opinion. Nevertheless, 
when analyzing separately, only savings banks representatives on the Board increase the 
pressure to issue a clean audit opinion. 
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The results confirm that Board characteristics have an 
important influence on financial reporting quality, in line with the views that have been 
expressed by several international bodies (e.g., FRC, 2003; OECD, 2004). The findings also 
suggest that both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional 
investors as a whole, since directors appointed by different types of institutional investors 
have various implications on the audit opinion. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study makes its core contribution by empirically 
showing that directors appointed by different types of institutional investors have diverse 
implications on the audit opinion. This evidence could be potentially helpful in providing a 
basis for regulatory actions, namely those aiming to influence the structure of the Board of 
directors. The results have significant implications for supervisors and regulators, whose role 
in safeguarding the financial system will benefit from an understanding of how the presence 
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of savings banks and commercial banks in non-financial firms Boards impacts audit opinion 
in a bank-based system. 
 
Key words: Corporate Governance, Audit Committee, Board of Directors, Institutional 
Investors, Financial Reporting Quality 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Persistence of accounting scandals has led to profound reconsideration of the workings 
of boards and audit committees. Research has shown that board characteristics may affect the 
quality of the board’s supervision of the financial reporting process (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Xie 
et al., 2003) and extant research on this issue has focused on board composition, specifically 
on the presence of independent directors (Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005). However, along 
with the presence of these directors, there are other board members that have hardly been 
studied in the literature: directors appointed by institutional investors. 
Institutional investors are among the most important controlling shareholders in 
continental Europe, where the principal agency conflict focuses on the expropriation minority 
shareholders wealth by controlling shareholders. In civil-law countries the importance of 
institutional investors as supervisors compensates for the weaknesses of investor protection 
laws (Faccio and Lang, 2002; de Andrés et al., 2005).The specific agency problems in 
European Continental countries have led to large block-holders, especially the institutional 
ones becoming directors. Thus, directors appointed by institutional investors (from now on 
institutional directors) have a significant influence on European Continental boards, 
accounting for 40 per cent of directorship in Spain, compared to 2 per cent in British firms 
(Heidrick and Struggles, 2011). 
Whereas recent studies have shown the prevalence of large institutional shareholdings 
around the world, research on the influence of institutional investors as directors is still 
scarce. Moreover, whether the role of non-independent non-executive directors (also known 
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as ‘grey directors’) is more like that of inside directors or outside directors remains 
ambiguous in the corporate governance literature (Hsu and Wu, 2010). Research has found 
that institutional directors have an important influence on leverage (Booth and Deli 1999; 
García-Meca et al., 2013), firm value (Kumar and Sighn, 2012), and earnings management 
(García and Gill, 2007). Given the importance of institutional investors in allocating capital to 
corporations, as well as their role in firm governance, an understanding of how their presence 
in boards affects the quality of financial information is undoubtedly needed. Our paper tries to 
fill this gap in the literature as, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the 
influence of directors appointed by institutional investors on the likelihood that a firm 
receives a qualified audit opinion.  
Our analysis follows three steps. First we study the impact directors who represent 
institutional investors, both on boards and audit committees, have on the quality of financial 
reporting. In a second step, according to recent literature, we assume that institutional 
investors cannot be considered as a homogeneous group due to their different incentives and 
ability to engage in the corporate governance (Almazán et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2007). We propose that the type of business relations between firms and 
institutional investors is a key issue to describe the role of institutional directors and, thus, 
their effects on the quality of information. Accordingly, we make a distinction between those 
who maintain business relations with the firm on whose board they sit, and institutional 
investors whose business activity is not related to the company in which they hold a 
directorship. In a third step, we focus on the specific role of bank directors on boards and 
audit committees and analyze their effects on the quality of information when they act as 
shareholders and directors. 
We use a sample of Spanish listed firms between 2004 and 2010. Spain is a good 
paradigm to study the effectiveness of institutional directors due to its being  the European 
 4 
 
country with the highest presence of institutional investors on the boards of large firms 
(Heidrick and Struggles, 2011). Differences both in the corporate governance systems of 
Spanish firms and the Spanish auditing system highlight the futility of extrapolating for Spain 
from studies of the Anglo-Saxon markets (Fernández and Arrondo, 2007). Unlike the Anglo-
Saxon capital markets, the ownership concentration and the lack of liquid capital markets in 
Spain have resulted in the board of directors being the prevalent mechanism of control and in 
the presence of the large block-holders, especially institutional investors, as directors. 
Regarding auditing processes, incentives implemented in countries with more of a tradition of 
auditing to help maintain high auditing quality are fairly limited in Spain (Ruiz Barbadillo et 
al., 2004). Finally, Spain offers a unique opportunity to analyze the conflicts of interests that 
arise from banks being simultaneously shareholders, creditors, and directors. 
Our results suggest that institutional directors are an effective monitoring device that 
leads to higher quality of financial reporting and, therefore, to less likelihood of qualified 
audit reports. Consistent with the relevant role of business relations with the firm, we find that 
directors appointed by pressure sensitive investors, both in boards and audit committees, have 
a higher impact on the unqualified audit opinion. Nevertheless, when analysing separately, 
commercial banks and savings bank representative directors show different attitudes. In this 
case, savings banks representatives on the board increase the pressure to issue a clean audit 
opinion. This could be justified by the specific composition of these entities, where the 
regional and local governing bodies exercise a decisive power in firm strategy
1
. Even though  
the Unified Code of Corporate Governance in Spain (2006) highly recommends forming audit 
committees of entirely independent and institutional directors, we fail to document a 
significant impact of the former, highlighting that it is the institutional (specifically pressure 
sensitive) and not the independent, the board and audit committee members, that influence the 
audit opinion. One explanation for this finding could be the “substitution effect hypothesis” 
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between institutional and independent directors. If this is the case, different levels of control 
provided by a single mechanism might be equally efficient, depending on the intensity of the 
control performed by other mechanisms available (Fernandez and Arrondo, 2005). To a 
certain extent, this lack of consistency could also lie in the lack of investor confidence in the 
role and true independence of “independent” directors in Spain (Crespí-Cladera et al, 2007; 
Lorca et al., 2011). 
Overall, our results confirm that board characteristics have an important influence on 
the quality of financial reporting, in line with the views that have been expressed by several 
international bodies (e.g., FRC, 2003; OECD, 2004). Because the principal agency conflict in 
continental Europe and many other countries focuses on the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ wealth by controlling shareholders, the analysis of the institutional directors’ 
influence on the quality of financial information highlight as a priority research question. The 
findings in this research partly support the importance of the monitoring function of non-
executive directors on the main board and audit committee. This study makes its core 
contribution by empirically showing that directors appointed by different types of institutional 
investors have varied implications on the audit opinion. This evidence could be potentially 
helpful in providing a basis for regulatory actions, namely those aiming to influence the 
structure of the board of directors. An understanding of the factors associated with audit 
qualification could also act as an aid to the auditor’s assessment of the engagement risk, 
including the planning process.  
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior studies set in Anglo-Saxon environments suggest that the existence of an audit 
committee and the independence of such a committee and of the full board of directors are 
associated with the quality of an entity’s financial reporting and auditing practices (Abbott 
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and Parker, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Farihna and Viana, 
2009). However, other studies (García-Osma and Gill, 2007; Sánchez-Ballesta and García-
Meca, 2009) show that independent directors appear to be less effective in carrying out this 
theoretical role of monitoring management in Communitarian countries, noting that the effect 
of board independence depends on investor protection rights. Specifically, the majority of the 
results on the monitoring role of independent directors in Europe show inconclusive results 
(Sánchez and García, 2009; Lorca et al., 2011), and some highlight that the supervising role is 
not played by independent directors, as UK and US based research suggests, but by 
institutional directors, that is, those representing the controlling shareholders (García-Osma 
and Gill, 2007). 
The assumed benefit of improved independence stems from the belief that independent 
directors are better monitors of management than are inside directors (DeFond and Francis, 
2006). On the other hand, insiders and others close to the company might have firm- or 
industry-specific knowledge that would aid in director performance (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Thus, some research at the board level reports that the 
market values inside directors on the board (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Klein, 1998). 
Hence, although outside directors serve as monitors and help minimize agency conflicts 
between shareholders and management; inside and affiliated directors provide firm-specific 
expertise that is valuable for planning the firm’s operations and development (Klein, 2002). 
Institutional investor interests, which are mainly to create the maximum level of return 
for their beneficiaries, lead directors appointed by them to extend their influence to the 
decision-making board committees, given that increased share value resulting from direct 
supervision can compensate for any supervisory costs that may be directly incurred. This puts 
pressure on corporate managers to make the company look attractive to institutional investors 
and to create more shareholder value. Thus, monitoring by institutional investors is likely to 
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result in improved firm performance because, as large and sophisticated shareholders, 
institutional investors have the incentive and expertise to monitor the management and can do 
so at a lower cost than atomistic shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). They are also able 
to exert enough influence to alter the governance structure and the firm’s course of actions.  
Institutional investors are known to influence various important corporate decisions. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Almazán et al. (2005), Borokhovich et al. (2006), Brickley et 
al. (1988), Bushee (1998), Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) show 
that institutional investors influence antitakeover amendments, R&D investment decisions, 
CEO compensation and profitability. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) also note that higher 
ownership by institutions that are likely to monitor managers is associated with more 
conservative financial reporting, and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) support the hypothesis that the 
presence of institutional investors provides incentives for analysts to publish unbiased or less 
biased research. In addition, institutional investors are often characterized as sophisticated 
investors who have advantages in acquiring and processing information compared with 
individual investors (e.g., Kim et al.1997; Bartov et al., 2000). 
Given institutional shareholder incentives to supervise managerial actions, a positive 
influence of institutional directors on the quality of information would be expected. We 
believe that because earnings information is important for business valuation purposes, 
institutional directors demand high quality information and exert more influence than other 
board members. This is because institutional owners, as a group, command large amounts of 
capital that are professionally managed and employed in the equity markets. Using this 
capital, institutional owners can exert influence by buying and selling large blocks of a firm's 
securities, and by holding voting rights that can be directly employed to influence the 
decisions of management (Kane and Velury, 2004). The existence of sophisticated 
institutional investors could also induce managers to provide high quality audits (Felo et al., 
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2003). According to these authors, by doing so, institutions can delegate the actual task of 
monitoring to auditors, and the cost of that monitoring is borne by all shareholders within the 
firm (the “delegation” hypothesis). Rajgopal et al. (2002), Chung et al. (2002), and Jiraporn 
and Gleason (2007) also suggest institutional investors serve as monitors, mitigating earnings 
management behavior. In this line, some authors find that the higher the proportion of non-
executive board members, the lower the probability of accounting fraud (Beasley 1996; Xie et 
al.,  2003; Peasnell et al., 2005).  
Regarding the audit committee, the Unified Code of Corporate Governance (2006) in 
Spain, recommends forming audit committees entirely of external directors (i.e., independent 
and institutional directors) in a proportion similar to that of the board of directors. According 
to previous research, when audit committees are made up by a high proportion of institutional 
directors, they are more likely to be more effective in protecting the credibility of the firm’s 
financial reporting since they are also external directors and independent of management 
(Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes, 2007). In this case, it will also be more difficult for 
management not to accept the adjustments proposed by auditors (McMullen and 
Raghunandan, 1996; Song and Windram, 2004).  
In this line, Carcello and Neal (2003) report that when an affiliated director is able to 
dominate the audit committee, management can often pressure the auditor into issuing an 
unqualified report despite going concern issues and may even go so far as to dismiss its 
auditor for refusing to change an opinion with qualifications. Klein (2002) also found a 
significantly negative association between abnormal accruals and the percent of outside 
directors on the audit committee. Similarly, García-Osma and Gill (2007) found that the main 
role in constraining earnings management in Spain is played by institutional and not 
independent directors. Hsu and Wu (2010) note that that greater the number of grey directors 
on the board and audit committee of UK firms, the lower probability of corporate failure. 
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However, more independent outside directors on board and audit committee may not 
effectively contribute to decrease the likelihood of corporate failure. 
In short we hypothesize that a higher number of institutional directors will increase the 
likelihood that the quality of financial statements will be better controlled and will increase 
the pressure to issue a clean audit opinion: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The quality of financial information is affected by the presence of institutional 
directors on both boards and audit committees. 
 
Theoretical work by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton 
(1998) highlights the choice institutions face between exerting monitoring effort for shared 
gain versus simply trading for private gain. Institutional investors vary in a number of 
dimensions, including the skill of their employees, their resources or incentives to gather 
information and the implicit or explicit pressure from firms in which they invest due to 
potential business relations (Brickley et al., 1988). In this line, different authors note that the 
presence or absence of business relationships can condition the institutional investor’s levels 
of influence. Researchers such as Brickley et al. (1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), 
Bushee (1998), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almazan et al. (2005), Borokhovich et al. (2006), 
Ferreira and Mato (2008) and Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) have shown that certain types 
of, but not all, institutional investors exert influence on antitakeover amendments, R&D 
investment decisions, CEO compensation, profitability, and earnings conservatism. García-
Meca et al. (2013) also show that institutional directors have diverse incentives to engage in 
corporate governance, noting different effects on cost of debt depending on the type of 
institutional director. 
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In order to better understand institutional monitoring and the sometimes conflicting 
evidence, we study institutional investors within boards of directors and audit committees and 
focus on pressure sensitive investor directors, who are those that maintain business with the 
firm in which they invest - basically directors who represent banking and insurance 
companies. Pressure sensitive investor directors focus mainly on the firm’s long-term 
viability, having more incentives to collect and process information. In this line, Brickley et 
al. (1998) find evidence supporting that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive 
shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of 
management’s recommendations. 
Porter (1992) argues that “long-term” or “dedicated” owners alleviate pressures for 
myopic investment behavior because their holdings provide incentives to monitor managers. 
Similarly, Dobrzynski (1993) and Monks and Minow (1995) argue that institutions that invest 
in firms with the intention of holding substantial ownership blocks over a long horizon have 
stronger incentives to monitor the firm. Han et al. (2009) show that firms are more likely to 
hire a Big 4 auditor when long-term institutional ownership is high, suggesting that long-term 
institutional investors view high quality audits as a viable means of improving corporate 
governance, while reducing their direct monitoring costs. Their results suggest that dedicated 
long-term institutional investors demand higher quality audits to enhance corporate 
monitoring, and that short-term institutional ownership is positively associated with higher 
audit risk. Prior research (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Brickley et al., 1988, Gaspar et al., 
2005 and Chen et al., 2007) also suggests that institutional investors' demand for conservatism 
is more likely to emanate from monitoring institutions with long term investment horizon.  
In contrast, pressure-resistant investors are known to put pressure on management to 
meet short-term earnings targets, which can increase the likelihood of financial misreporting- 
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Coffee (1991) notes that short-term institutional investors may have incentives to sell their 
stock due to poor performance rather than initiate corrective action.  
While this evidence is suggestive, these studies do not investigate directly the 
relationship between directors appointed by pressure sensitive investors and the quality of 
information. Thus, we pose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The quality of financial information is affected by the presence of pressure-
sensitive institutional directors on both boards and audit committees. 
 
Nevertheless, even within pressure sensitive investors (insurance companies and 
banks) there are some differences. Banks are the most prevalent and identifiable 
representative of institutional investors, especially in Continental countries. On the other 
hand, in the US, earlier regulation has caused the corporate governance system to differ 
historically from that in other countries such as Spain, Germany and Japan where, by design, 
institutions (particularly banks) have played a large role in the ownership and monitoring of 
corporations (Gillan and Starks, 2006). 
In Spain, banks are not only a major source of funding and financing for the country’s 
business fabric but they also hold strong positions as company stockholders and members of 
boards. Bankers can play a certification role on the board since a banker joining the board of a 
firm can signal to the market that the firm is unlikely to experience financial distress. Hadlock 
and James (2002), Johnson (1997) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) document that long-
term relations between banks and non-financial firms reduce the asymmetric information and 
allow banks to control firm’s decisions. Thus, they diminish the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) also evidence that analysts issue more optimistic 
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recommendations when they are affiliated with banks that have an existing relationship with 
the firm covered and when they work for banks with larger businesses.  
In addition, after recent regulation changes and press coverage following the 
accounting scandals, the need has been stressed for financial expertise on corporate boards. 
Thus, if a bank develops specialized knowledge through lending to many firms in a particular 
industry, bankers could provide valuable industry-specific financial expertise as board 
members of firms in that industry (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Moreover, a qualified report 
is costly for a bank director because free-rider problems and information asymmetries make it 
difficult for firms to renegotiate with creditors.  
The Spanish banking system is an industry with two main institutions, commercial 
banks and savings banks, which compete with each other for loans and deposits. Spanish 
savings banks have a special governance structure, since they are controlled by politicians and 
public entities (Sapienza, 2004; Crespí et al., 2004). In recent last years the regional 
regulation have increased the presence of public administration in savings banks at the 
expense of depositors’ representation, leading the regional and local governments to exercise 
a decisive power in the renewal of the governing bodies and the establishment of the savings 
banks’ strategy (Fonseca and González, 2005)2. Thus, it is interesting to analyze separately 
how the governance of these banks affects the quality of financial reporting when they are 
members of other firms’ boards and audit committees. This comparison is relevant since both 
commercial and savings banks operate under the same regulatory framework and market 
conditions. We therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The quality of financial information is affected by the presence of commercial 
and saving bank directors on both boards and audit committees. 
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EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Sample 
The sample is drawn from the population of Spanish non financial firms listed on the 
Spanish Stock Exchange during 2004–2010. We exclude financial companies both because 
they are under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of their board of 
directors and because of their special accounting practices. We obtain our data from two 
databases. Audit opinion, financial information and firms’ market value come from the 
“Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) database, while corporate governance 
information is collected from the annual corporate governance reports that all the listed 
companies have had to publish since 2003. 
We build an unbalanced panel of 627 firm-year observations from 162 firms. Roughly, 
our sample accounts for more than 95 percent of the capitalization of Spanish non financial 
firms. The panel is unbalanced because during this time period some firms became public, 
and other firms delisted as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless, the 
estimations based on unbalanced panels are as reliable as those based on balanced panels 
(Arellano, 2003).  
 
Variables 
The dependent variable (IA) is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the company 
receives a qualified audit opinion and 0 otherwise. Some other papers have used audit opinion 
as a proxy for the quality of information (Bartov et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2001; Butler et al., 
2004; Pucheta and de Fuentes, 2007; Farihna and Viana, 2009). 
As independent variables, we define INST as the proportion of institutional directors on 
the board. These are mainly directors appointed by institutional investors and they often 
represent banking and insurance companies or investment funds. INDEP variable represents 
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the independent members of the board. In line with García-Meca et al. (2013), we define 
SENSIT as the proportion of the board members who are representative of pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies). Given our special attention to the 
roles played by the different institutional investors, we define the COM_BANK variable as 
the proportion of directors who are representative of commercial banks and SAV_BANK as 
the proportion of directors who are representative of saving banks.  
We define analogous variables concerning the presence of these directors on the audit 
committee. Specifically, INSTAC and INDEPAC represent the existence of institutional and 
independent directors on the audit committee respectively. SENSITAC is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1if there are pressure-sensitive representatives on the audit committee, 
COM_BANKAC and SAV_BANKAC are respectively dummy variables for directors 
appointed by commercial banks and saving banks on the audit committee. 
We control for a number of factors that can potentially affect audit opinion and that 
make our research comparable to previous studies. SIZE is the log of total assets and is a 
measure of firm size. Carcello et al. (1995) and Mutchler et al. (1997) report a negative 
relationship between company size and the receipt of a qualified audit report. In line with 
deAngelo (1981) this is probably due to the fact that the issuance of qualified audit reports 
could cause a switch of the audit firm, and the initial auditor would lose the quasi-rents 
associated with future audits of the client. 
Previous literature shows that big auditors provide higher quality services (Teoh and 
Wong, 1993) and they are also better able to express a qualified opinion (Lennox, 1999; 
Farinha and Viana, 2005). Thus, we propose BIGFOUR as a dummy control variable that 
takes the value 1 if the opinion is issued by a Big Four audit firm. Regarding the ownership 
structure, Sánchez and García-Meca (2005) reported that director ownership is an effective 
monitoring device that leads to higher quality of financial reporting and therefore, less 
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likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports. Then, we define DIREC_OWN as the 
percentage of stock owned by directors. In addition, we expect that the larger the audit 
committee, the harder it would be for managers to put pressure on a significant number of 
members, making it more difficult to resist the adjustments proposed by auditors. Thus, we 
include as control variable AC_SIZE, defined as the size of the audit committee and measured 
as the number of members.  
Given that financial health has been identified as a factor that may increase the 
likelihood of the auditor’s issuing a qualified audit report (Carcello et al., 1995; Mutchler et 
al., 1997), two variables have been included to control for the financial distress effect. These 
are LEV as a proxy for the agency cost of debt and measured by debt over total assets and 
losses in the previous year (LOSS). We also control for the return on assets (ROA), defined as 
operating income before interests and taxes over total assets. According to previous literature 
(e.g. Sloan, 1996; Bradshaw et al., 2001) we expect a negative relationship between audit 
qualifications and ROA because, from the auditor perspective, lower ratios mean a higher 
probability of corporate failure. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient the management is at 
using its assets to generate earnings. Previous evidence shows that ROA is a significant factor 
in explaining corporate failure. In this sense, Altman (1968), Altman et al. (1977), Izan 
(1984), Mcgurr and DeVaney (1998), Laitinen and Laitinen (2000), Zapranis and Ginoglou 
(2000), Ginoglou et al. (2002), Beaver et al. (2005) and Lakshan and Wijekoon, (2013), 
among others, found ROA as a significant variable. Table 1 provides a summary of all the 
variables. 
Insert table 1 about here 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the mean value, the median, the standard error, and the percentiles 10 
and 90 of the main variables. As can be seen, representatives of large shareholders account for 
around 44.39% of directorships on the board and 78% on the audit committees, with pressure 
sensitive institutional investors representing 7% on the board and 20.60% on the audit 
committee. In accordance with the international trend to increase the importance of 
institutional investors (Li et al., 2006 and Cuatrecasas, 2012), the proportion of directors 
appointed by institutional investors in our sample has grown from 42.97% in 2004 to 45.45% 
in 2010 on the board and from 77.78% in 2004 to 79.57% in 2010 on the audit committee. 
The presence of independent directors is 30.03% on the board and 84% on the audit 
committee. These data provide evidence that the percentage of institutional investors, pressure 
sensitive and independent directors is higher on the audit committee than on the board.  
In addition, it can be appreciated that the size of the company is 13.56 (log of the total 
assets), 86% of the companies are audited by one of the big auditing firms, 27.03% of the 
directors of the board held shares and the size of the audit committee, on average, is 3.5 
members. Finally, we would like to highlight that the level of leverage of the companies is 
58.64%, on average, 12% of the companies reported losses the previous year and the 
companies report a return on assets, on average, of 3.43%.  
Insert table 2 about here 
In table 3 we present the Pearson correlation matrix in order to test for multicollinearity. 
The correlation between most of the pairs is not significant and is low, generally below 0.3. 
None of the correlation coefficients is high enough (> .80) to cause multicollinearity problems 
(see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2000), except the pair SENSITAC-
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SAV_BANKAC, which is correlated by construction. According to these results, we can, 
therefore, conclude that the models are free of multicollinearity problems. 
Insert table 3 about here 
Table 4 shows the mean difference of INST, INDEP, SENSIT, COM_BANK, 
SAV_BANK, INSTAC, INDEPAC, SENSITAC, COM_BANKAC, and SAV_BANKAC 
variables between firms with unqualified and qualified audit reports to test for the presence of 
differences in means between both groups of companies. The analysis of the results reveals 
that the presence of institutional investors, pressure-sensitive institutional investors and 
saving banks on the board (INST, SENSIT and SAV_BANK) and on the audit committee 
(INSTAC, SENSITAC and SAV_BANKAC) is higher in companies receiving unqualified 
audit reports. This implies that institutional investors, pressure-sensitive institutional investor 
and saving banks directors on the board and on the audit committee enhance the quality of the 
financial information. On the other hand, the results report that the mean difference for 
independent and commercial banks directors on the board and on the audit committee 
between unqualified and qualified audit reports is negative and positive, respectively, but 
none of them is statistically significant. Therefore, it seems that institutional investors, 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors and saving banks directors exert much more control 
on the board and audit committee than independent and commercial banks directors, in order 
to enhance the quality of the financial information.  
 
Regression Results 
In table 5 we show the results of the logistic regression for the board. As can be 
observed, we have built three models. Model 1 analyses the proportion of institutional 
directors (INST) and independent directors (INDEP) on the board. In model 2, only the 
variable proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive 
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institutional investors (SENSIT) is examined, while model 3 studies the proportion of the 
board that represents commercial banks (COM_BANK) and saving banks (SAV_BANKS). 
The Chi-squared test shows that the three models are statistically significant at 1%.  
Insert table 5 about here 
According to our predictions, and as  can be appreciated in model 1 of table 5, the 
variable institutional investors sitting on the board (INST) presents the expected sign and is 
statistically significant at 5%. Thus, we can accept Hypothesis 1 and it can be concluded that 
the proportion of institutional investors sitting on the board enhances the quality of financial 
information since their presence reduces the likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports. 
The variable proportion of independent directors sitting on the board offers the expected sign, 
but it is not statistically significant. This shows that institutional investors on the board exert 
much more influence than other board members regarding the demand for high quality of the 
financial information. Authors such as Almazán et al. (2005), Borokhovich et al. (2006), 
Brickley et al., (1988), Bushee (1998), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Ljungqvist et al. (2007) 
and Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) also provide evidence of the positive impact of this class 
of directors on firms.  
In model 2, the influence of the pressure-sensitive institutional investors on the quality 
of financial information is analyzed. The results reveal that the variable SENSIT, which 
represents this category of directors, presents the expected sign and is statistically significant 
at 5%. As a result, the second hypothesis can be accepted, and therefore, we can reach the 
conclusion that pressure-sensitive institutional investors (banks and insurance companies) 
sitting on the board decreases the likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports. This implies 
a high quality of financial information. This evidence is in line with prior research which 
reports that not all institutional investors, but only some types, exert influence on corporate 
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decisions (Brickley et al., 1988; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005; Ferreira and 
Mato, 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012 and García-Meca et al., 2013). 
In Spain, the presence of institutional investors representing banks is more prevalent 
than institutional investors representing insurance. In addition, banks on the board will exert 
more control in the company, demanding a high quality of the financial information, since bad 
quality financial information can make it more difficult for firms to renegotiate with creditors. 
For this reason, in model 3 we analyze the impact of this type of directors sitting on the board 
(COM_BANK and SAV_BANK) on the quality of the financial information. According to 
the results in table 5, it can be seen that, contrary to our predictions, the variable 
COM_BANK is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the variable SAV_BANK 
presents the expected sign and is significant at 5%. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 is partially 
accepted since only the presence of saving banks sits on the board increases the quality of the 
financial information because the likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports is reduced. 
Hadlock and James (2002), Johnson (1997), Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Ljungqvist 
et al. (2007) document the relevant role that bank directors sitting on the board play in the 
companies.  
As regards the control variables, in the three models all of them show the expected 
sign, but only the size of the company (SIZE) and the return on assets (ROA)  are statistically 
significant at 1% or 5%. Therefore, these results provide evidence that large companies with 
high levels of return on assets are likely to receive less qualified audit reports. Consequently, 
these firms offer higher quality financial information.  
To sum up, the analysis of the structure of the board shows that the proportion of 
institutional investors, pressure-sensitive institutional investors and saving banks directors 
enhances the quality of financial information, as the presence of these directors reduces the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report. Similar results have been reported by 
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Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012). Thus, this result reveals the important role that institutional 
investors on the Spanish boards play as a mechanism of Good Corporate Governance.  
In table 6 we provide the results of the logistic regression for the audit committee. As 
with the board, three models also have been built in the same way. According to the Chi-
squared tests, the three models are statistically significant at 1%.  
Insert table 6 about here 
In model 1, the variables which represent the presence of institutional investors and 
independent directors sit on the audit committee present the expected sign, but only the 
presence of institutional investors (INSTAC) is statistically significant at 10%. In line with 
Felo et al. (2003) and García-Osma and Gill (2007), independent directors on audit 
committees (INDEPAC) do not affect the quality of information. Thus, Hypothesis 1 can be 
also accepted. In model 2, the variable SENSITAC representing the presence of pressure-
sensitive institutional investors is negative, as predicted, and statistically significant. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis for audit committees is also accepted. In model 3, neither 
COM_BANKAC nor SAV_BANKAC are statistically significant, although both offer the 
expected sign. This last result can be explained because on the audit committee, on average, 
there are fewer members than on the board and, as a result, the presence of commercial and 
saving banks is likely to be smaller. In this case, the third hypothesis cannot be accepted. 
These conclusions reveal that the presence of institutional and pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors sitting on the audit committee increases the quality of the financial information as 
the companies where they are appointed are less likely to receive a qualified audit report. 
Thus, this evidence strengthens the role of institutional investors on the audit committee too, 
and within this type of directors, pressure-sensitive directors gain notable relevance.  
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As with the board models, all the control variables report the expected sign, but only 
the size of the company and the return on assets are statistically significant, and in  models 2 
and 3 the variable proportion of shares held by the directors is also significant.  
In conclusion, big and profitable companies whose directors held shares and where 
institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors sit on the audit committees 
are less likely to receive qualified audit reports, and therefore, the quality of the financial 
information is higher.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The specific agency problems in European Continental countries have led to an 
increasing presence of the large block-holders as directors, especially directors appointed by 
institutional investors. Although considerable research has been conducted on institutional 
ownership, the literature to date has failed to reach a consensus on whether institutional 
investors perform a specific role in boardrooms. Thus, given the importance of institutional 
investors in allocating capital to corporations and their role in firm governance, an 
understanding of how their presence on boards affects the quality of financial information is 
undoubtedly needed. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the 
effect of directors appointed by institutional investors on audit opinion. We study the 
effectiveness of institutional directors in Spain, the European country with the highest 
presence of institutional investors on boards of large listed firms. 
We propose that the type of business relations between firms and institutional 
investors is a key issue in describing the role of institutional directors and, thus, their effects 
on the quality of information. Accordingly, we focus on those who maintain business 
relations with the firm on whose board they sit (pressure sensitive directors), and analyze their 
influence both on boards and audit committees. In a third step, we examine the specific role of 
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bank directors on boards and audit committees and analyze their effects on the quality of 
information when they act as shareholders and directors. 
Our results suggest that institutional directors are an effective monitoring device that 
leads to higher quality of financial reporting and therefore, less likelihood of receiving 
qualified audit reports. Thus, when boards are made up by a high proportion of institutional 
directors, they are more likely to be more effective in protecting the credibility of the firm’s 
financial reporting since they are also external directors and independent of management. The 
results suggest that, compared to independent outsiders, institutional directors may be more 
effective in overseeing management since they may have more firm-specific knowledge. 
Moreover, institutional directors have a relatively close relationship with top management, so 
they may also reduce the conflict between board and top management. These results support 
the relevant role of institutional directors on boards and the lack of influence of independent 
directors in European countries, already suggested in the literature.  
In addition, despite the fact that in the Spanish context the Unified Corporate 
Governance Code (2006) holds that the audit committee should be made up exclusively by 
independent and institutional directors, our results also show that only institutional, non 
independent directors on audit committees influence the quality of information, suggesting 
that independent and institutional directors may play distinguishable governance roles both on 
boards and audit committees. The lack of significance of independent directors on both boards 
and audit committees, could be related to the measure of independence, in Communitarian 
studies in general, where there are many concerns that board members are not independent of 
those who nominate them. Another explanation could be the substitution effect between 
independent and institutional directors. 
Consistent with the significant role of business relations with the firm, we find that 
directors appointed by pressure sensitive investors, on boards and audit committees, have a 
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higher impact on the unqualified audit opinion. This confirms that institutions that invest in 
firms with the intention of holding substantial ownership blocks over a long horizon have 
stronger incentives to monitor the firm. Nevertheless, when analyzing separately, only saving 
banks representatives on the board increase the pressure to issue a clean audit opinion. This 
could be justified by the specific composition of these entities, where the regional and local 
governing bodies exercise a decisive power in the firm strategy. Moreover, the high 
politicization of the savings banks could increase the pressure on auditors to issue a clean 
opinion. Thus, our results suggest that auditors are less likely to modify the reports when 
firms have board directors appointed by saving banks. The lack of influence of saving banks 
directors in audit committees could be related to their low representation on this committee. 
This study contributes to the literature by showing that one of the ways in which 
institutional investors play a monitoring role is through influencing audit opinion when they 
are both board and audit committee members. The findings also suggest that both researchers 
and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole, since directors 
appointed by different types of institutional investors have varied implications on the audit 
opinion. The findings are pertinent given the concerns about the regulation and quality of 
auditing services. Finally, the results have significant implications for supervisors and 
regulators, whose role in safeguarding the financial system will benefit from an understanding 
of how the presence of savings banks and commercial banks in non-financial firms boards 
impacts audit opinion in a bank-based system. Thus, the results have some implications for 
policy makers who are trying to find a suitable board model for companies and they define the 
role of independent directors. A greater discussion and analysis is required so that 
independent directors remain independent of the large shareholders and are able to safeguard 
minority shareholder rights. 
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NOTES 
1
In the context of the global financial crisis, criticism of the politicization of the savings banks has shifted to the 
centre of the political debate after some scandals in the management of some savings banks that have led to their 
being taken into administration by the Bank of Spain (Caja Castilla la Mancha, CAM, Cajasur). As a 
consequence, the reform of the savings bank law in 2010 addressed this issue by reducing the political power of 
public authorities and claiming for the privatization and the professionalization of governing bodies with the aim 
of depoliticizing the government of savings banks and capitalizing them. 
 
2
As a consequence, the reform of the savings bank law in 2010 addressed this issue by reducing the political 
power of public authorities with the aim of depoliticizing the government of savings banks and capitalizing them 
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definition 
Variables Description 
IA Dummy variable that equals 1 when the company receives a 
qualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise 
INST Proportion of institutional directors on the Board 
INDEP Proportion of independent directors on the Board 
SENSIT 
Proportion of the board directors who are representative of 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
COM_BANK 
Proportion of the board directors who represent commercial 
banks 
SAV_BANK Proportion of the board directors who represent saving banks 
INSTAC Dummy variable that equals 1 if institutional directors sit on the 
audit committee, and 0 otherwise 
INDEPAC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if independent directors sit in the 
audit committee, and 0 otherwise  
SENSITAC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors sit on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise 
COM_BANKAC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if commercial banks institutional 
investors sit on the audit committee 
SAV_BANKAC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if saving banks institutional 
investors sit on the audit committee 
SIZE Total assets (log) 
BIGFOUR 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when the company is audited by 
one of the Big Auditing Firm, and 0 otherwise 
DIREC_OWN Proportion of stocks held by directors 
AC_SIZE Total number of members on the audit committee  
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LEV Ratio of book debt to total assets 
LOSS 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports losses the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise 
ROA Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Main Descriptive Statistics 
Mean, standard deviation and quartiles of the main variables. IA is equal to 1 if the company receives a qualified 
audit report; INST is the proportion of institutional investors on the Board; INDEP is the proportion of 
independent directors on the Board; SENSIT, COM_BANK, SAV_BANK is the proportion of the directors who 
represent pressure sensitive institutional investors, commercial banks or saving banks on the Board; INSTAC is 
equal to 1 if institutional directors sit on the audit committee; INDEPAC is equal to 1 if independent directors sit 
in the audit committee; SENSITAC, COM_BANKAC, SAV_BANKAC is equal to 1 if pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors, commercial banks directors and saving banks directors sit on the audit committee; SIZE is 
the log of total assets; BIGFOUR is equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big auditing firm; 
DIREC_OWN is the proportion of shares held by directors; AC_SIZE is the number of members of the audit 
committee; LEV is the book value of debt over total assets; LOSS is equals to 1 if the company reports losses the 
previous year; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets. 
 
a) Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Perc. 10 Perc. 90 
INST 627 44.39% 44.44% 23.26% 13.33% 75.00% 
INDEP 627 30.03% 30.00% 18.74% 0% 55.87% 
SENSIT 627 7.03% 0% 10.91% 0% 21.43% 
COM_BANK 627 1.14% 0% 4.70% 0% 0% 
SAV_BANK 627 5.03% 0% 8.52% 0% 16.66% 
SIZE 627 13.56 13.16 2.01 11.10 16.44 
DIREC_OWN 627 27.03% 18.52% 26.40% .04% 65.00% 
AC_SIZE 627 3.52 3.00 .85 3.00 5.00 
LEV 627 58.64% 60.89% 19.77% 30.09% 81.16% 
ROA 627 3.43% 3.83% 9.70% -3.31% 10.12% 
b) Dummies variables 
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 0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
INSTAC 141 22% 486 78% 
INDEPAC 103 16% 524 84% 
SENSITAC 498 79.40% 129 20.60% 
COM_BANKAC 602 96% 25 4% 
SAV_BANKAC 532 84.90% 95 15.15% 
BIGFOUR 87 14% 540 86% 
LOSS 552 88% 75 12% 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix 
Pearson’s correlation matrix. IA is equal to 1 if the company receives a qualified audit report; INST is the proportion of institutional investors on the Board; INDEP is the 
proportion of independent directors on the Board; SENSIT, COM_BANK, SAV_BANK is the proportion of the directors who represent pressure sensitive institutional 
investors, commercial banks or saving banks on the Board; INSTAC is equal to 1 if institutional investors sit on the audit committee; INDEPAC is equal to 1 if independent 
directors sit on the audit committee; SENSITAC, COM_BANKAC, SAV_BANKAC is equal to 1 if pressure-sensitive institutional investors, commercial banks directors and 
saving banks directors sit on the audit committee; SIZE is the log of total assets; BIGFOUR is equals to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big auditing firm; 
DIREC_OWN is the proportion of shares held by directors; AC_SIZE is the number of members of the audit committee; LEV is the book value of debt over total assets; 
LOSS is equal to 1 if the company reports losses the previous year; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total. *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 
percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
IA INST INDEP SENSIT COM_ 
BANK 
SAV_ 
BANK 
INSTAC INDEPA
C 
SENSIT
AC 
COM_ 
BANKAC 
SAV_ 
BANKAC 
SIZE BIGFOUR DIREC_ 
OWN 
AC_ 
SIZE 
LEV LOSS 
INST -.11***                 
INDEP .03 -.66***                
SENSIT -.11*** .14*** -.05               
COM_BANK -.02 .06 -.04 .47***              
SAV_BANK -.12*** .10*** -.01 .78*** .08**             
INSTAC -.09** .58*** -.35*** .17*** .09** .11***            
INDEPAC .01 -.37*** .62*** .03 -.03 .05 -.10***           
SENSITAC -.11*** .09** -.02 .71*** .35*** .57*** .27*** .05          
COM_BANKAC -.04 .054 -.014 .32*** .66*** .07 .12*** .00 .40***         
SAV_BANKAC -.09** .04 .01 .55*** .07 .70*** .23*** .03 .83*** .10**        
SIZE -.16*** .036 .24*** .21*** .16*** .29*** .01 .19*** .19*** .17*** .25***       
BIGFOUR -.02 -.01 .25*** -.04 .03 .03 -.01 .25*** .07 .08** .07 .33***      
DIREC_OWN -.03 .15*** -.33*** -.02 -.10** -.06 .11*** -.17*** -.07 -.12*** -.10** -.33*** -.23***     
AC_SIZE -.09** .11*** .08** -.01 .01 -.03 .19*** .15*** .17*** .01 .13*** .27*** .22*** -.10**    
LEV .00 .14 .05 .01 .14*** .09** .10** .06 -.02 .09** .02 .41*** .13*** -.10** .04   
LOSS .12*** -.00 .03 -.05 .06 -.06 .01 .11*** -.04 .05 -.06 -.16*** -.01 .02 -.10*** .14***  
ROA -.18*** -.02 .04 -.01 .01 -.01 -.01 -.05 .04 .03 .02 .17*** .11*** -.06 .19*** -.21*** -.42*** 
 
  
TABLE 4 
Test of Means Comparison 
INST is the proportion of institutional investors on the Board; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors 
on the Board; SENSIT, COM_BANK, SAV_BANK is the proportion of the directors who represent pressure 
sensitive institutional investors, commercial banks or saving banks on the Board; INSTAC is equal to 1 if 
institutional investors sit on the audit committee; INDEPAC is equal to 1 if independent directors sit on the audit 
committee; SENSITAC, COM_BANKAC, SAV_BANKAC is equal to 1 if pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors, commercial banks directors and saving banks directors sit on the audit committee; p-value is the 
significance level to accept the null hypothesis of equality of means between groups. 
 
Variable Unqualified audit 
reports (N=569)  
Mean 
Qualified audit 
reports (N=58)  
Mean  
Mean 
difference 
p-value 
INST 
45.20 36.20 9.00 .01 
INDEP 
29.80 32.00 -2.20 .44 
SENSIT 
7.40 3.00 4.40 .00 
COM_BANK 
1.20 .70 .50 .63 
SAV_BANK 
5.40 1.70 3.70 .00 
INSTAC 
.79 .66 .13 .02 
INDEPAC 
.83 .84 -.01 .84 
SENSITAC 
.22 .07 .15 .01 
COM_BANKAC 
.04 .08 -.04 .36 
SAV_BANKAC 
.16 .05 .11 .03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 5 
Results of the Logistic Regression for the Board of Directors 
 
Estimated coefficients (p-value) through the ordinary least square method. The dependent variable is IA is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 if the company receives a qualified audit report; INST, INDEP, SENSIT, 
COM_BANK and SAV_BANK is the proportion of members of the board who represent institutional investors, 
independent, pressure sensitive institutional investors, commercial banks and saving banks directors; SIZE is the 
log of total assets, BIGFOUR is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the company is audited by one of the auditing 
big firms; DIREC_OWN is the proportion of shares held by directors; AC_SIZE is the number of directors on 
the audit committee; LEV is the book value of debt over total assets; LOSS is equal to 1 if the company reports 
losses the previous year; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets. *** for 99 percent 
confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Model 1 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Model 2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Model 3 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
INST 
_ -.02** 
(.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEP 
_ -.01 
(.60) 
 
 
 
 
 
SENSIT 
_  
 
-.04** 
(.05) 
 
 
 
COM_BANK 
_  
 
 
 
.01 
(.85) 
 
SAV_BANK 
_  
 
 
 
-.07** 
(.02) 
 
SIZE 
_ -.28*** 
(.01) 
 
-.27** 
(.02) 
 
-.25** 
(.02) 
 
BIGFOUR 
+ .68 
(.15) 
 
.50 
(.30) 
 
.53 
(.24) 
 
DIREC_OWN 
_ -.01 
(.21) 
 
-.01 
(.13) 
 
-.01 
(.12) 
 
AC_SIZE 
_ -.14 
(.50) 
 
-.22 
(.29) 
 
-.24 
(.25) 
 
LEV 
+ .54 
(.51) 
 
.17 
(.84) 
 
.20 
(.80) 
 
LOSS 
+ .4 
(.76) 
 
.14 
(.75) 
 
.18 
(.69) 
 
ROA 
_ -.05*** 
(.01) 
 
-.04** 
(.02) 
 
-.04** 
(.02) 
 
Firm fix effects  Included  Included 
 
Included 
 
Observations  627 
 
627 
 
627 
 
Classification  90.60% 
 
90.70% 
 
90.70% 
 
2  49.10 *** 
 
46.96*** 
 
49.45*** 
 
  
TABLE 6 
Results of the Logistic Regression for the Audit Committee 
Estimated coefficients (p-value) through the ordinary least square method. The dependent variable is IA is a 
dummy variable equals to 1 if the company receives a qualified audit report; INSTAC, INDEPAC, SENSITAC, 
COM_BANKAC and SAV_BANKAC is equal to 1 if institutional investors, independent, pressure sensitive 
institutional investors, commercial banks and saving banks directors sit on the audit committee; SIZE is the log 
of total assets, BIGFOUR is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the company is audited by one of the auditing big 
firms; DIREC_OWN is the proportion of shares held by directors; AC_SIZE is the number of directors on the 
audit committee; LEV is the book value of debt over total assets; LOSS is equal to 1 if the company reports 
losses the previous year; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets. *** for 99 percent 
confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Model 1 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Model 2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Model 3 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
INSTAC 
_ -.55* 
(.09) 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEPAC 
_ .19 
(.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
SENSITAC 
_  
 
-.97* 
(.08) 
 
 
 
COM_BANKAC 
_  
 
 
 
-.56 
(.60) 
 
SAV_BANKAC 
_  
 
 
 
-.83 
(.18) 
 
SIZE 
_ -.33*** 
(.00) 
 
-.30*** 
(.01) 
 
-.30*** 
(.01) 
 
BIGFOUR 
+ .51 
(.27) 
 
.53 
(.24) 
 
.55 
(.23) 
 
DIREC_OWN 
_ -.01 
(.14) 
 
-.01* 
(.08) 
 
-.01* 
(.07) 
 
AC_SIZE 
_ -.16 
(.44) 
 
-.17 
(.42) 
 
-.20 
(.33) 
 
LEV 
+ .50 
(.55) 
 
.16 
(.84) 
 
.27 
(.74) 
 
LOSS 
+ .16 
(.71) 
 
.18 
(.68) 
 
.18 
(.68) 
 
ROA 
_ -.04*** 
(.02) 
 
-.04*** 
(.02) 
 
-.04*** 
(.02) 
 
Firm fix effects  Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Observations  627 
 
627 
 
627 
 
Classification  90.70% 
 
90.60% 
 
90.60% 
 
2  45.12 *** 
 
45.90*** 
 
44.46*** 
 
